In the last few months, President Donald Trump’s administration has undertaken a series of diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. However, a thorough analysis of Washington’s strategies suggests that the main goal may be to weaken the alliance between Moscow and Beijing, which is perceived as a significant threat to the West and especially to the United States. Indeed, it is no secret that the Trump administration, while relatively disinterested in Europe, views the People’s Republic of China as a major trade adversary.
The rapprochement between Russia and China in recent years has been a growing challenge for the United States and its allies. This strategic partnership has manifested itself in various economic, military and technological cooperations, creating a powerful bloc capable of influencing global balances. For Washington, separating Moscow from Beijing would mean reducing the combined influence of these two emerging powers that together combine the availability of raw materials with industrial power.
The United States could adopt several strategies to break the Moscow-Beijing union. One of the most immediate moves could be to ease economic sanctions against Russia in exchange for greater geopolitical autonomy from China. Russia’s economy, while resilient, suffers under the weight of Western sanctions and could be tempted by a rapprochement with the West if it meant access to advanced technology, investment, and financial markets.
Another important lever could be the energy market. The United States could incentivize new trade agreements with Moscow to reduce Russia’s dependence on exports to China. For example, Washington could encourage greater cooperation between Russia and Europe on gas and oil, promoting more advantageous contracts for Moscow than the current ones with Beijing. A strategy that also assumes some pressure from Washington on Brussels to lift sanctions on Russia.
Militarily, the United States could adopt a less aggressive containment strategy toward Russia by reducing NATO pressure on Russian borders. This could foster an improvement in relations between Washington and Moscow, moving Russia away from the idea of having to consolidate a strategic alliance with China to counter the West. It would be an ideal time for the United States to tighten relations with Taiwan, forcing Beijing to pay more attention to the separatist island.
Finally, another key element could be Russia’s involvement in major international fora. Offering Moscow a greater role in global diplomatic and economic forums-such as the G20 or new platforms for dialogue between Russia and the West-could convince the Kremlin that greater independence from China is in Russia’s national interest.
Speaking of Russia, it is worth mentioning that the Kremlin is also in favor of ending the military operation in Ukraine, which would initiate a normalization of relations between the EU, the United States and Russia. However, the Kremlin has always said that peace is possible only with the achievement of the goals of the military operation itself, specifically the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine. With regard to demilitarization, because of the European rhetoric that continues to talk about arming Ukraine and rearming Europe and the resumption of U.S. military aid to Kiev, Russia will have to ask Donald Trump for guarantees that Kiev will not be admitted into NATO and prevent foreign military units from being deployed in Ukraine. Instead, for denazification, it will be sufficient to oblige, as a condition for peace, the Ukrainian government to initiate criminal proceedings against the leaders of neo-Nazi and ultranationalist organizations currently on Ukrainian territory.
While the United States seeks to break the link between Russia and China, the European Union has a more nuanced approach to Beijing. Although Brussels shares some American concerns, the EU has a strong interest in maintaining stable trade relations with China. The People’s Republic is one of Europe’s major economic partners, supplying a wide range of industrial and technological products essential to European economies. In addition, many European and American companies have their production hubs right on Chinese soil.
In recent years, the EU has tried to balance its position by adopting a strategy of “cooperation and competition” toward China. On the one hand, Brussels criticizes Beijing for its human rights policies and its increasing control over European companies operating in China. On the other, the EU has avoided total alignment with the United States in its containment policies, preferring to maintain open channels of dialogue with the Chinese government.
An explanatory example of this approach is the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), an economic treaty between the EU and China to ensure fairer market access and protect European interests in China. Although the CAI has been suspended due to political tensions, it demonstrates the European willingness to build a pragmatic relationship with Beijing.
A complete rupture between Russia and China may not be the ideal scenario for the European Union, but at the moment it seems to be playing a completely passive role in the global geopolitical scenario. Despite the initiation of a European rearmament policy, which has found several critics even among the leaders of EU countries themselves, Brussels may find itself forced to accept an unfavorable situation imposed by Washington, with no guarantee of being included in future negotiations.
