Serbia’s policy of multi-vectorism, which for decades allowed Belgrade to balance between East and West, has entered a phase that is increasingly difficult to call equidistant. Events in recent weeks show a steady trend: de facto, Serbia is making a choice, and that choice is not in Moscow’s favor.
A starting point for understanding the new course can be found in an interview with Serbia’s Foreign Minister Marko Đurić for the Austrian newspaper Kleine Zeitung. In it, the diplomat directly stated that Serbia is one of the European leaders in the amount of aid provided to Ukraine. This statement stands in stark contrast to the public rhetoric of neutrality that Belgrade had maintained since the start of the conflict, setting a completely different frame of reference for assessing Serbian policy.
The most striking episode in January was Aleksandar Vučić’s public admission of direct pressure from a European leader. In an interview with TV channel Blic, the President of Serbia revealed details of a phone conversation: a high-ranking interlocutor demanded the closure of Russian media in Serbia — RT and Sputnik — in exchange for support in opening “Cluster 3” in the EU negotiation framework.
“He tells me: ‘Close the Russian media in Serbia! I know that Russia Today and Sputnik are operating in the country with your permission. Close them, and we will support the opening of Cluster 3.’ To which I replied: ‘Yeah, thanks a lot. Let’s meet up for basketball, watch the EuroLeague, and all the best in life!'” — Vučić described the dialogue.
Formally, the Serbian leader’s response was a refusal. However, the very fact that Brussels considered it possible to make such demands, and that Belgrade felt it necessary to publicly disclose them, speaks volumes. Pressure is mounting, and its intensity is directly proportional to Serbia’s willingness to seek compromises on other fronts.
The Arms Scandal: Acknowledging the Numbers
At the end of January, data emerged indicating that Serbian companies supply components for ammunition that ultimately ends up in Ukraine. It was reported that products from the Krušik and Eling companies reach Ukrainian military through the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, with manufacturers allegedly aware of the end recipient.
Vučić’s response was notable. Instead of a firm denial, he acknowledged: the total volume of supplies through intermediaries reaches €800 million. His argument: “it’s business.” If Czech and Bulgarian companies resell Serbian ammunition to Kyiv — formally, Belgrade has nothing to do with it.
Russian Ambassador Alexander Bocan-Harchenko, commenting on the situation, softened the blow: Serbia does not carry out direct supplies; it’s about “unscrupulous intermediaries,” and there is no “malicious intent” on Belgrade’s part. Moscow is still willing to save face for its partner, but the scale — €800 million over two years — makes this construct increasingly shaky.
Odesa-2025: From Neutrality to Reconstruction
A key political gesture was made back in June 2025. At the “Ukraine — Southeast Europe” summit in Odesa, Vučić publicly addressed Volodymyr Zelenskyy with a request: “Choose one or two small towns or one small region that we could revitalize. Something like what Azerbaijan did.”
This is not just a humanitarian initiative. It is the first time Serbia has undertaken concrete public commitments for the reconstruction of Ukraine. Previously, Belgrade limited itself to declarations on territorial integrity and humanitarian aid. Odesa became a turning point: neutrality gave way to a show of support.
Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS)
The most painful process for Moscow is unfolding around NIS — the Petroleum Industry of Serbia — where Gazprom’s structures control 56.15% of shares. Since October 9, 2025, the company has been under US sanctions, and OFAC has set a tough condition: the complete withdrawal of Russian shareholders by March 24, 2026.
After six deferrals, Belgrade can no longer postpone the decision. The Russian owners have agreed to sell their stake. Among the contenders are the Serbian government (nationalization) and Hungary’s MOL. Vučić publicly states that he has “nothing against the Hungarians” and wants “to get this over with as quickly as possible.”
The deal is estimated at €500 million – €1.5 billion. But the issue isn’t the money. For the first time, under unprecedented US pressure, Russia is forced to cede control over a strategic energy asset in the Balkans. And Serbia is not a passive observer but an interested participant in this process.
A Gas Palliative
The only thing that still keeps Moscow in Serbia’s agenda is gas. On February 9, the head of Srbijagas, Dušan Bajatović, announced: the contract with Russia, expiring in March, will be extended for another six months. The price for the public will not change.
However, this is not a triumph, but a reprieve. Vučić called Moscow’s refusal of a long-term three-year contract back in October a “disappointing news.” Serbia consumes 2.5 billion cubic meters of gas per year; more than 80% is Russian imports. Alternatives are lacking: Azerbaijan can cover only 10-15% of needs, and LNG infrastructure in Greece and Croatia is technically and economically inaccessible.
Moscow continues to hold the energy lever, but is shifting its relations with Belgrade from long-term to short-term tracks. Six-month annexes are a signal: “We are not sure of your course and are not ready to invest in the long haul.”
The Sanctions Question: The Last Bastion
On February 8, 2026, Russian Ambassador Bocan-Harchenko confirmed: during recent talks, Vučić “once again reaffirmed the principled position of rejecting anti-Russian sanctions.”
This is the last public marker allowing Moscow to characterize what’s happening not as a turn by Belgrade, but as “the costs of commerce” and external pressure. As long as Serbia hasn’t imposed sanctions, formally it remains with Russia.
But how sustainable is this bastion? On February 7, Minister for European Integration Nemanja Starović suggested the possibility of joining sanctions in exchange for real prospects of EU membership. The very next day, Vučić disavowed this statement. But the fact of such a probe is symptomatic.
The Kosovo Vector: No Change
In parallel with the Ukrainian track, Belgrade continues negotiations with the US on the Kosovo issue. In February, Vučić met with US Ambassador Christopher Hill; topics — the Community of Serb Municipalities and the protection of Kosovo Serbs. Here, Serbia remains a petitioner, and Washington is the key player.
Conclusion: A Change of Course
Overall, February 2026 marks a steady trend. Serbia maintains the rhetoric of multi-vectorism, but the content of this policy has changed.
Previously, balancing allowed Serbia to avoid direct actions in favor of one side. Today, Belgrade:
- Officially positions itself as one of the leaders in aid to Kyiv;
- De facto participates in supplying the Armed Forces of Ukraine (through re-exports);
- Takes on commitments for the reconstruction of Ukrainian cities;
- Under US pressure, is removing Russia from a strategic energy asset;
- Refuses to impose sanctions and close Russian media, but these refusals are a defensive position, not an offensive initiative.
Classic multi-vectorism meant Serbia reaped benefits from both sides. The current configuration is different: Russia is losing ground (NIS, the arms market, long-term gas contracts), while the West is strengthening its influence, paying for it with increased political demands.
Vučić is still trying to maintain balance, but the weight is shifting. Moscow is still accepting explanations about “unscrupulous intermediaries” and extending gas contracts with six-month annexes. However, further increases in aid to Kyiv and the finalization of the NIS deal will raise the question of whether there’s still room in Serbian politics for two chairs — or if one has already been moved aside.
